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Abstract 
In multiphase Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), sensor nodes are redeployed 
periodically to replace nodes with depleted batteries. In order to keep the network 
resilient against node capture attacks across different deployment epochs, called 
generations, it is necessary to refresh the key pools from which cryptographic keys are 
distributed. In this thesis, we propose Uneven Key Predistribution (UKP) scheme that 
uses multiple different key pools at each generation. Keys are drawn unevenly from 
these key pools and loaded to sensor nodes prior to deployment. Nodes are loaded with 
keys not only from their current generation, but also from future generations. We 
conduct simulation based performance evaluation in mobile environments using three 
different mobility models. One of them, Circular Move Mobility model, is first 
proposed in this thesis. Our UKP scheme provides self healing that improves the 
resiliency of the network up to 50% under heavy attack as compared to an existing 
scheme in the literature. Moreover, our scheme provides almost perfect local and global 
connectivity. 
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ÇOK FAZLI TELSİZ DUYARGA DÜĞÜMÜ AĞLARI İÇİN EŞİTSİZ ÖN 
YÜKLEMELİ ANAHTAR DAĞITIM ŞEMASI 
Onur Çatakoğlu 
Bilgisayar Bilimi ve Mühendisliği, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2013 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Albert Levi 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Telsiz Duyarga Ağları, Anahtar Ön Dağıtımı,  Çoklu Fazlı Duyarga 
Ağları, Dayanıklılık, Güvenlik 
Özet 
Çok fazlı Telsiz Duyarga Ağlarında, duyarga düğümleri bataryaları tükenmiş 
düğümlerin yerine geçmek üzere periyodik olarak tekrar konuşlandırılır. Ağı, nesil adı 
verilen farklı konuşlandırma zaman aralıklarında düğüm ele geçirme saldırılarına karşı 
daha güçlü hale getirmek için kriptografik anahtarların dağıtımının yapıldığı anahtar 
havuzunu tazelemek gerekmektedir. Bu tezde, her nesil için farklı anahtar havuzları 
kullanan Eşitsiz Ön Yüklemeli Anahtar Dağıtım şeması anlatılmaktadır. Bu anahtar 
havuzlarından alınan farklı sayıda anahtarlar duyarga düğümlere konuşlandırılmanın 
öncesinde yüklenir. Düğümlerde yüklü olan anahtarlar, düğümün sadece kendi nesline 
değil, aynı zamanda gelecek nesillere ait anahtarlardan da oluşmaktadır. 
Simulasyonlarımızda, performans değerlendirmesini mobil ortamlar için üç tane 
mobilite modeli kullandık. Bunlardan bir tanesi olan Çembersel Hareket Mobilite 
modeli ilk olarak bu tezde sunulmaktadır. Eşitsiz Ön Yüklemeli Anahtar Dağıtım 
şeması literatürde bulunan bir şemaya göre daha ağın dayanıklılığını ağır saldırı altında 
%50'ye kadar arttıran bir öz iyileşme sağlamaktadır. Bunların yanı sıra, şemamızda 
yerel ve genel bağlantı oranı yaklaşık 100% olmaktadır. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are used to carry wide range of data for 
various kinds of applications such as military, security, smart homes, tele-health, 
environmental observation and industry automation. Information that is transferred via 
those networks may contain not only temperature readings for habitat monitoring but 
also classified military data for battlefield surveillance, which should not be seen by an 
unauthorized person. Therefore, security is important for these applications. WSNs have 
very limited resources in terms of memory and computational power. Hence, symmetric 
key cryptography is mostly used for existing key management schemes. However, 
predistribution of the symmetric keys effectively and efficiently in terms of resource 
usage have always been a challenge in WSNs.  
An attacker can learn keys that are inside of any node by capturing the node and 
use these keys to compromise links between other sensor nodes. In Random Key 
Predistribution (RKP) scheme, Eschenauer and Gligor [1] attempt to solve this issue by 
distributing keys, which are drawn randomly from a collection of keys, called key pool, 
to sensor nodes. Since the same key pool is used for every node, an adversary who 
captures sensor nodes persistently, called constant attacker, would eventually learn the 
entire key pool of the corresponding sensor network. 
Since WSNs are battery-powered systems, new nodes have to be redeployed 
periodically. In multiphase WSNs, sensor nodes with depleted batteries are replaced in 
time with periodical redeployment of the nodes. Castelluccia and Spognardi proposed 
RoK (A Robust Key Predistribution Protocol for Multiphase WSNs) scheme [5] for 
multiphase WSNs. In RoK, nodes’ battery lives are divided into phases and they 
automatically self heal the network against node capture attacks by updating their keys 
at the end of each phase. Since the adversary has not captured newly updated keys yet, 
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communications established by these keys cannot be compromised. Therefore, while 
RKP scheme cannot achieve such self healing mechanism, RoK scheme can establish a 
resilient network by utilizing the redeployment feature of WSNs. Yet, there is still room 
for enhancing the resiliency of the network in multiphase WSNs.  
Most of the recent studies do not consider mobile environment. In other words, 
they assume that sensor nodes are static. However, this is not always correct, because 
there are many types of applications in commercial, environmental and military studies 
such as housekeeping robots, service industry, wildlife tracking, patient tracking, 
autonomous deployment, shooter detection [3] which require a mobile network. 
1.1.  Contribution of the Thesis 
In this thesis, we propose a novel method for key predistribution in multiphase 
and mobile wireless sensor networks, called Uneven Key Predistribution (UKP). The 
main idea behind our method is to employ distinct key pools and assign keys to the 
nodes from these key pools by utilizing the temporal likelihood information of the ages 
of the nodes. In this way, the number of keys taken from different generations become 
uneven. At each deployment, newly deployed nodes take their keys not only from the 
existing key pools, but also from a new distinct key pool. As in RoK [5], in UKP 
scheme, the future generation keys that a node can know is limited to its maximum life. 
Keys in the network are renewed at each redeployment phase and, correspondingly, the 
adversary can never compromise entire key pool. This feature provides self healing to 
the network. Differently from the RoK scheme, UKP uses multiple distinct key pools to 
refresh keys instead of using forward and backward hash operations for the sake of 
resiliency. In our scheme, hash operation is used only for creating a session key 
between two nodes from common keys not in key pool generations. Thus, cryptographic 
overhead is minimal. 
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In performance evaluation, we consider three models; Random Walk Mobility 
model, Reference Point Group Mobility model and Circular Move Mobility model. 
Among these, Circular Move Mobility is a novel model that we propose in this thesis. 
For the performance evaluation, we compare our UKP scheme with RoK [5]. Since 
RoK is proposed for static WSNs, we adopted it to work with mobility models. Our 
results show that we have better resiliency than RoK scheme without decreasing the 
local connectivity of network and without adding any additional memory overhead.  
1.2.  Organization of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the background 
information on WSN security. Section 3 provides a details our scheme and explains it in 
more detail. Section 4 presents the mobility models and Section 5 gives performance 
evaluation of UKP. Finally, Section 6 concludes the thesis. 
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2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
A sensor node can sense various type of phenomenon including the occurrence of 
events such as temperature drop or pressure. [23]. A wireless sensor node can 
communicate airborne to transfer the collected data to another sensor node. Wireless 
Sensor Networks (WSNs) consist of large collection of sensor nodes which senses and 
delivers information via a short-range wireless communication. They can sense and 
process wide range of data including humidity, temperature, vehicular movement, 
lightning condition, pressure, etc. for various kinds of applications such as military, 
security, smart homes, tele-health, environmental observation and industrial automation 
[16]. Sensor nodes do not only communicate with each other, but also communicate 
with base stations. The duty of the base station is to manage the network and collect the 
data that is gathered from environment. Base station can perform costly operations for 
the network and store considerable amount of data. 
Sensor nodes that are deployed to a certain area transmit information by 
communicating each other in multihop manner. The information they carry finally 
reaches to a sink node (a.k.a. a base station). When an event is detected by a sensor 
node, it creates a corresponding data packet. Then, this packet is transmitted to the sink 
node(s) possibly via intermediate nodes. Illustration of this process is given in Figure 
2.1. The sensed information can be aggregated and processed along the way by the 
nodes. Also, they can store the data which is sensed from the environment or received 
from another node. Additionally, sensor nodes can have supporting technologies, such 
as Global Positioning System (GPS), to determine their current location or their final 
destination [23].  
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Fig. 2.1 Communication between nodes and sink node 
The disadvantage of WSNs is their limited resources. These limitations do not 
allow them to have advanced technologies. Their computational power is insufficient to 
carry out costly tasks since embedded processors in nodes are not powerful as in wired 
networks. Further, they are not designed to store excessive data because of their 
inadequate memory capacity. Their memory usually consist of flash memory and RAM 
in order to store application code, sensed data and intermediate computations. Also, 
their communication range is limited and it is mostly dependent on environmental 
factors. These limitations are partly due to the limited energy and physical size of the 
sensor nodes [19]. WSNs are battery operated systems. Battery of a sensor node usually 
cannot be replaced and node becomes unusable after the depletion. Nodes will 
eventually stop functioning and become unable to send and receive messages. This 
leads to lack of connectivity in the network. Thus, nodes are redeployed periodically to 
replace nodes with depleted batteries. This kind of sensor networks are called 
multiphase WSNs. 
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Sensor nodes may be static or mobile depending on the application. Most of the 
recent studies do not consider mobile environments and assume that sensor nodes are 
static. However, it is not always correct, because there are many types of applications in 
commercial, environmental and military studies such as housekeeping robots, service 
industry, wildlife tracking, patient tracking, autonomous deployment, shooter detection 
[3]. All of these applications require mobility of nodes. Also, mobile nodes can improve 
the performance of the network in terms of energy efficiency, throughput and 
connectivity with small impact to data routing and end-to-end latency [20]. 
2.1.  Security of Wireless Sensor Networks 
Information that is transferred via WSNs may contain not only temperature 
readings for habitat monitoring, but also classified military data for battlefield 
surveillance which should not be observed by an unauthorized person. Since WSNs are 
deployed to an open and unattended field, they are vulnerable to many types of attacks. 
It is harder to detect an intrusion, capturing or corruption in the network compared to 
wired networks as the communication medium is air or underwater in some cases. 
Therefore, security is very important in WSNs. 
Security requirements of WSNs are listed as follows [15] [19]. 
 Confidentiality: This is a security service that provides secrecy for 
transmitted data between two nodes. Nodes encrypt critical information 
before the transmission. Receiving node decrypts this information after the 
data is fully transmitted. An attacker should not be able to decrypt this 
information even if he monitors the entire communication. Confidentiality 
is a requirement against these attacks.  
 Authenticity: This service is used to prevent unauthorized access. Nodes 
check the identity of each other to decide if the message comes from a real 
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sender or not. An attacker can spoof or imitate identities of nodes in the 
network in order to obtain sensitive data or corrupt the network by 
spreading false information. Authenticity is used to prevent this kind of 
attacks. 
 Integrity: Attacker can modify data by changing some of the bits of the 
message or changing it completely. Integrity feature ensures that message 
transmitted between two nodes is not modified by an malicious person. 
In order to establish a secure communication, there is need for encrypted links 
and/or authenticated nodes. Several existing security protocols that are used in wireless 
networks may not be suitable for WSNs. Public key (asymmetric key) cryptographic 
algorithms such as RSA [17] and Diffie-Hellman [18] are inapplicable considering 
nodes' inadequate computational power for costly encryption and decryption operations. 
In order to fulfill the requirement for secure communication, symmetric key 
cryptography is the optimal solution to cover the limitations of WSNs. AES and DES 
[21] are some of the well known and standardized algorithms for symmetric key 
cryptography. There are also other lightweight symmetric key algorithms proposed for 
WSNs [22].    
In symmetric key cryptography, encryption and decryption operations are 
performed using a single key. Hence, sender and receiver parties should be supplied 
with the same key in order to form a proper secure communication. This shared key 
between communication parties should be secret, because if an adversary learns this 
key, he also gains the encryption/decryption capabilities in that network. As a result, all 
the communication links which use this shared key become compromised.   
Although using symmetric key cryptography meets most of the constraints of 
WSNs, it brings up another problem which is key distribution. Sensor nodes should be 
able to transfer data to intermediate nodes which will deliver the information when a 
sink node is not available. Owing the fact that classified data should not be monitored 
along the way, these paths are required to be secure. If two nodes share a secret key, 
they can establish a secure communication. However, distribution of the symmetric 
keys have always been a challenge in WSNs due to the limitations of sensor nodes. An 
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obvious solution to key distribution problem is to predistribute the keys to sensor nodes 
before deployment. One method is to load a single key to all sensor nodes and using this 
key in all communication links.  However, if all nodes are loaded with the same key, the 
security of network relies on this single key. In this case, when a sensor node is 
captured by an attacker, the communication key is revealed and attacker can 
compromise the entire network. Another method is to generate pairwise keys for all 
node pairs. Then, each node is loaded with its pairwise keys for all other nodes in 
network. In this case, even if an attacker captures a sensor node and learns all its keys, 
he cannot use these keys to compromise the communication links between other nodes. 
Yet, this method leads to very high memory consumption because a sensor node needs 
to keep all its pairwise keys in memory. Considering the huge number of sensor nodes 
in a WSN, this method seems to be infeasible in practice. The key distribution problem 
in WSNs is widely studied in the literature. More detailed explanation about this topic 
will be given in Section 2.2.  
2.1.   Hash Functions 
Hash functions are used to generate fixed-length fingerprints of arbitrarily large  
data. Output of the hash function is denoted as     , where   is the message of 
variable length and      is the hash function. The calculated      has fixed length for 
any message  . In Figure 2.2, this process is illustrated. A hash function is a one-way 
function. In other words, for a given       , it should be practically infeasible to 
compute message . 
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Fig. 2.2 Illustration of hashing process 
One important requirement for secure (cryptographic) hash functions is collision-
resistance. Since hash functions map various length of data to a fixed size data, there is 
a possibility of two input values give the same output value. This situation is called 
collision. In other words, collision is having the same hash value,            for two 
distinct pieces of data,   and   . This is an unwanted situation, because an adversary can 
intentionally search for collisions. Hence, a collision resistant hash function, where it is 
infeasible to find any pair of inputs sharing the same hash value, is desired in WSNs. 
Reader can refer [24] for detailed information. 
2.2.  Related Works 
Because public key cryptography is a very costly option for WSNs in terms of 
computational power and memory consumption, most of the studies use symmetric key 
cryptography to secure WSNs. In symmetric key cryptography, two nodes must have 
the same secret key, in order to establish a secure communication. Distribution of these 
secret keys to a node is difficult after node deployment because environment may be 
monitored by an attacker. Thus, keys are needed to be preloaded to nodes properly 
before deployment.  
Random Key Predistribution (RKP) is the most popular scheme that is proposed 
by Eschenauer and Gligor [1]. It is a basis to many existing schemes in wireless sensor 
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networks. RKP has three phases: key setup, shared key discovery and path key 
establishment. 
Key setup: In this phase, each node receives a group of keys, called key chains, 
from a large pool, P. Each key in the key pool has a unique ID for key discovery. Key 
chains are loaded into nodes prior to deployment. 
Shared key discovery: In the field, sensor nodes try to securely communicate with 
their neighbors if they share a secret common key. If two nodes have the key(s) with the 
same ID(s), then they can securely communicate with each other by encrypting the data 
with same keys. Established link is said to be a direct secure link. 
Path key establishment: When two neighboring nodes do not have a secret key in 
common, they can look for a common intermediate node with where both share a secret 
key. With the help of common secure neighbor, they can establish a secure link. This 
phase called path key establishment. 
 Figure 2.3 gives the illustration for key pool and key chain for RKP scheme. If 
length of the key chain, m, and size of the key pool, P, are chosen properly, a resilient 
network can be achieved whilst maintaining a fair network connectivity. However, a 
constant attacker eventually learns all the keys in the key pool in this scheme and he can 
compromise the entire network [5]. 
Key Chain
Key Chain
Key Pool
 
Fig. 2.3 Key Pool and Key Chains for RKP 
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Several other probabilistic schemes are proposed in [2, 11, 12, 13] after RKP 
scheme. Among them, Chan et al. [2] improved RKP scheme by using a threshold 
value, q > 1, for the number of common keys that are needed for establishing a secure 
connection. If two nodes meet this requirement, they hash their all common keys to 
create a session key. Session key is used to encrypt the communication between these 
nodes. Yet it requires more keys to be stored before the deployment or fewer keys in the 
key pool to achieve a good connectivity ratio. Increase in number of stored keys results 
in an additional memory overhead.  
Since sensor nodes are battery operated systems, they have to be redeployed 
periodically for the sake of connectivity of the network. These new nodes are assumed 
to be deployed at regular epochs which are called generations. Also, lifetime of a node 
is assumed to have an upper bound and it is determined by generation window,   . A 
newly deployed sensor node’s battery at generation   will deplete before generation   
  . In the RoK scheme [5], key pools evolve for each new generation and sensors 
update their key rings by hashing their keys. In other words, keys have lifetimes and 
they are refreshed when a new generation is deployed. While they are limiting the 
lifetime of predistributed keys, they achieved to maintain high connectivity. This 
mechanism is achieved by using forward and backward hash chains. In every 
redeployment phase, previously deployed nodes hash their keys and new nodes with 
fresh keys are replaced with nodes whose batteries are empty. Each sensor node takes 
its keys from both forward and backward key pools,     and    , that are associated 
to its generation. Each key pool has     random keys.  
Notation used for RoK is explained in Table 2.1. This notation also will be used 
for explanation of our proposed scheme Uneven Key Predistribution (UKP) scheme in 
Section 3. 
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Table 2-1 Symbols used for RoK and UKP 
Symbol Explanation 
  Sensor A 
  Last generation of the network 
     Forward key pool at gen.  
     Backward key pool at gen. 
   Key pool of gen.   
   Number of keys that are taken from key pool   
  
 
 Number of keys that are taken from key pool   for node A 
  Key pool size 
    
 
 Forward key ring of A at gen. 
    
 
 Backward key ring of A at gen. 
   
 
 Key ring of A that deployed at gen.   
    Generation window 
   
 
  -th forward key at gen.   
   
 
  -th backward key at gen.   
    
 
    -th key of  
  
    Common secret key between sensor A and B 
     Secure hash function 
  Key ring size 
 
In the RoK scheme [5], key pools evolve for each new generation and sensors 
update their key rings by hashing their keys. In other words, keys have lifetimes and 
they are refreshed when a new generation is deployed. While they are limiting the 
lifetime of predistributed keys, they achieved to maintain high connectivity. This 
mechanism is achieved by using forward and backward hash chains. In every 
redeployment phase, previously deployed nodes hash their keys and new nodes with 
13 
 
fresh keys are replaced with nodes whose batteries are empty. Each sensor node takes 
its keys from both forward and backward key pools,     and    , that are associated 
to its generation. Each key pool has     random keys.  
Forward key pool at generation   defined as          
 
,    
 
, …      
 
} where 
   
          
    Similiarly backward key pool at generation   will be          
 
, 
   
 
, …      
 
} where    
        
    . While a node at generation   takes its forward 
keys from     , it takes its backward keys from            . Therefore, key rings of 
the node will be formally represented as; 
    
      
                         
 
    and  
    
      
                                
 
     
for forward and backward key ring respectively. 
A sensor B deployed at generation   in the range of              
communicates with sensor A while their common keys’ indices are              
respectively as follows. 
while     , 
          
      
               
      
                 
      
                
If two neighboring nodes have multiple shared common keys, all of them are used 
for the session key,    . An adversary cannot compute keys from past generations by 
using forward keys, and cannot compute keys from future generations by using 
backward keys. Since all of the common keys including both forward and backward 
keys are used for establishing a secure channel, this mechanism provides forward and 
backward secrecy. 
There are some other works inspired by RoK that focus on multiphase networks. 
RPoK [6] is a polynomial-based RKP scheme proposed by Ito et al. for multiphase 
WSNs. Using private subkey that is indirectly stored into every each node, they are able 
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to establish a resilient network. Yi et al. [4] proposed a hash chain based scheme (HM 
scheme) for multiphase WSNs by using different key matrixes for every phase which is 
the separated work time of the nodes. 
Moreover, there are some studies focusing on the mobility of the WSN. Tas et al. 
[8] proposed Mobile Assisted Key Distribution in Wireless Sensor Network. In this 
paper, keys are distributed by a mobile element that handles the overload of key 
distribution. In their proposed schemes, mobile robot broadcasts key material to sensor 
nodes and all nodes in the radius of the robot can receive the keys. They discuss and 
evaluate feasibility of their schemes by simulation. Another scheme, proposed by Das 
[9], utilizes post deployment knowledge in mobile sensor networks. In this work, nodes 
are assumed to know their current coordinates as they move. They assign location 
information to each keying materials and keys are given priority when the distance 
between node's current location and post deployment location that is stored in the key is 
smaller. Nodes in that location can establish a secure communication link by using these 
prioritized key. Karaca et al. [10] used mobile base stations to distribute keys to sensor 
nodes. Nodes have only keys to communicate with this base station at first. When two 
nodes want to establish a secure communication, they ask for a session key from the 
base station. 
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3. UNEVEN KEY PREDISTRIBUTION  SCHEME 
In this section we present our proposed Uneven Key Predistribution (UKP) 
scheme for mobile multiphase wireless sensors.  
Communication between generations is a must; because every non-
communicating sensor node pair will lead to decrease in connectivity. In RoK [5], keys 
are updated and refreshed at the end of each phase. Therefore, two nodes which are 
from different generations can establish a secure channel with this update mechanism.  
UKP follows a different mechanism for that purpose. It is based on average age of 
nodes in the network i.e. keys are predistributed to a node according to its life time. 
Every sensor node from generation   can communicate with another sensor node from 
different generation in the range of               as in the RoK. However in UKP, 
instead of taking   number of keys from a key pool, a node takes its keys from    
number of key pools. In other words, our scheme predistributes the keys not just from 
the key pool of the current generation, but also from key pools of future generations.  
 
Fig. 3.1 Distribution of average age of the nodes. 
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The main idea of UKP is to distribute keys considering nodes’ average age 
distribution. Our sensor node life time modeling, which is also used in RoK [5], is a 
probabilistic one based on Gaussian (normal) distribution with mean 
   
 
 and standard 
deviation 
   
 
 where    is set to 10. Figure 3.1 shows average age distribution of the 
sensor nodes. As can be seen from this figure,  most of the nodes in the network are 
newly deployed or young. Starting with age 5, the number of old nodes decreases 
significantly. Since the number of younger nodes is significantly larger than the old 
ones, we distribute more keys from the key pools closer to a node's generation than the 
older ones with the aim of increasing connectivity. These details will be elaborated in 
the next subsection. 
3.1.  Pools and Key Assignments 
In UKP, there are   distinct pools that are not associated with each other. A sensor 
node takes its keys from    number of consecutive key pools in terms of generations. In 
order to decide how many keys to pick from a particular key pool, we use the 
distribution shown in Figure 3.1. In that case, a sensor has the most keys from its own 
generation key pool and takes fewer keys from key pools that belong to further 
generations.  
More formally, a node at generation   takes its keys from                 . 
The number of the keys taken from these generations are denoted as 
                where                   . Actual   values that we 
use in our UKP scheme are given in Table 3.1. In our UKP scheme, a node deployed at 
generation  , may have common keys with the nodes deployed in the generation range 
                 . Thus, if a  
   generation node is captured, only the nodes 
deployed at generation in the abovementioned range are affected. This provides forward 
and backward secrecy. 
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Table 3-1 Actual  percentages of key size for UKP where    set to 10 
                                                
                                           
 
The key ring of node  , which is denoted as    
 
 is composed of all the key sets 
coming from different generations of key pools as stated above. Similarly, if node B is 
at generation      , key ring of node B which is denoted as    
     will take its keys 
from key pools                         . Node B does not have any keys from 
                  key pools. In other words, if there is at least    number of 
generations difference between two nodes, these two nodes do not share any common 
keys. In this way, we provide self healing, because compromised keys become outdated 
in time.  
We represent key ring of a node A at generation   as follows. 
   
  
 
 
 
 
     
           
    
               
 
    
                     
  
where,     
                are the keys selected from corresponding  
  using 
uniform random distribution with replacement.  
 
The size of the key ring produced in this way,   is calculated as follows. 
                    
The purpose of having an uneven key distribution, i.e., using more keys from 
closer key pools in terms of generation is to achieve higher local connectivity in 
network. Moreover, this will strengthen the self healing property, since a compromised 
key has less chance of existence in further generations. In other words, most of the keys 
will be outdated sooner than the remaining ones and resiliency will be enhanced by the 
arrival of the new nodes with fresh keys. Each key in the key pools has a unique ID for 
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key discovery similar to RKP [1] scheme. Sensor nodes broadcasts IDs of its keys and 
when two neighboring nodes share at least one common key, session key establishment 
phase starts. 
3.2.  Session Key Establishment 
Any two nodes, say node   and node  , can establish a session key only if they 
share at least one common key in their key rings. The session key is computed as the 
hash of all common keys that nodes   and   share. This key is denoted as    . The 
common keys used in session key establishment are chosen irrespective of the 
generations of keys. In other words, even if the two nodes come from different 
generations, they use all of the keys in their key rings to find common keys for session 
key establishment. Let us say that node   comes from generation  , node   comes from 
generation   and the condition     holds for node generations. Then, if the common 
keys   and   share are denoted as  
    
       
    
     
     
     
        
                
then, the session key is computed as follows. 
          
               
As an example, if node   comes from generation  , node   comes from 
generation     as shown in Fig. 2, and the set of common keys they share are    
 
,    
 
, 
   
   
,    
   
,    
   
,    
   
 and     
   
, the session key is computed as follows. 
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Again, the common keys coming from different key pools 
                         and consequently different generations are used together to 
form the session key. 
 
j - 2 j  j + 2 j + 4 j + 6 j + 8 j + 10 
B 
A 
 
Fig. 3.2 Generation windows and overlapping generations of nodes A and B. 
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4. MOBILITY MODELS 
In order to simulate node mobility, we used three models: (a) Random Walk 
Mobility model, (b) Reference Point Group Mobility model and Circular Move 
Mobility model (c). Among these, Circular Move Mobility model is a new one that we 
propose together with our research group. These mobility models are explained below. 
4.1.  Random Walk Mobility Model 
In this model, a sensor node chooses a direction and speed randomly using 
uniform distribution. Then it moves in that direction for a fixed amount of time, which 
is taken as one minute in our simulations. When it finishes its movement, this process 
repeats itself with new direction and speed. A node which reaches the boundary of 
simulation area is reflected back with the same angle. Past location and speed 
information are not stored, so no memory usage is needed. Therefore, this model is 
suitable for the sensor nodes. In Figure 4.1, movements of the 5 nodes are illustrated for 
Random Walk Mobility model. The reader can refer to [7] for more detailed information 
about Random Walk Mobility model. 
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Fig. 4.1 Illustration of Random Walk Mobility model. 
4.2.  Reference Point Group Mobility Model 
This model covers both groups’ random movement and random movement of 
individual nodes inside a group. Each group moves based on a node that is chosen as 
central node. This feature is provided with reference points. Individual nodes pick a 
reference point randomly around the central node and this reference points are updated 
with the movement of central node. Individual nodes moves around the central node 
with minor randomness. In Figure 4.2, movements of the 3 groups of nodes are 
illustrated for Reference Point Group Mobility model. The reader can refer to [7] for 
more detailed information about Reference Point Group Mobility model. 
 
Fig. 4.2 Illustration of Reference Point Group Mobility model. 
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4.3.  Circular Move Mobility Model 
A novel mobility model called Circular Move Mobility is presented in this 
section. In this model, nodes are deployed around the perimeter of a circular area and 
move towards the center of this circle as time passes. In this way, the area is fully 
covered in time. Hence, we end up with a mobility model to cover a 2D area with a 
simple one-dimensional deployment strategy. This is, actually, one of our motivations 
in developing this model. We assume that a vehicle circles around the area and deploys 
nodes from eight different points on the perimeter. After deploying nodes on the 
perimeter, they start to scan the area as they move towards to the center. Nodes, whose 
batteries are depleted, can be collected easily since they cluster around the center of the 
deployment area. In this way, dead nodes can easily be removed out of the field. This is 
our second motivation behind this new model. There are two phases of this model: (i) 
deployment phase, and (ii) movement phase. 
In deployment phase, nodes are deployed from eight different and equidistant 
points on circle that we call bunch points from now on as in the Figure 4.3. We assume 
that nodes deployed from these points will spread along and off the arc. Nodes are 
distributed through the arc of the circle,    , according to Gaussian distribution. 
Similarly, nodes are distributed off the arc through a line,  , which is congruent to the 
radius of the circle. The distance between this point and the center of the circle is 
decided according to the Gaussian distribution. 
Majority of nodes are expected at around bunch point and fewer nodes are 
expected to be closer to the arc as distance from the bunch point increases. Hence, 
nodes cluster in certain area called density ellipse.  In Figure 4.3, this area is illustrated. 
In that area, node population should be higher due to the Gaussian distribution model. 
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Fig. 4.3 Illustration of Density Ellipse. 
 
Fig. 4.4 Movement of a sensor node in one round. 
 
In movement phase, nodes start moving towards to the center after they are 
deployed. They do not stop until they reach the center or their batteries are depleted. 
Nodes choose a speed vector which is directed at center and congruent to the radius. We 
refer to this speed vector as linear speed from now on. Linear speed is decided using 
uniform random distribution between a maximum and a minimum value at each round. 
While moving in the direction of center, nodes have an angular displacement at each 
round. The rate of change of this displacement is defined as angular speed. If a node's 
Bunch Point 
    
A 
O 
B 
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maximum angular speed is given as  , an angular speed,   , is decided using uniform 
random distribution within the range of       . Hence, node can move clockwise or 
counter-clockwise according to the   speed vector.  
As an example consider a node with initial point       is  
           
            
where       is the center coordinates,   is the radius of the circle and   is initial the 
angle as depicted in the Figure 4.4. If the linear speed of the node is   per round, then 
new distance to the center in terms of   and   becomes           for the next round 
where     is the magnitude of the vector   . If the angular speed is   per round which is 
chosen randomly between       , then new coordinates of the node is calculated as  
                     
                    
where     is the magnitude of the vector  . 
As a result, node moved from its initial point,      , to a new point,         with two 
random variables,   and  . This process is repeated by starting         to a new 
coordinate using two random variables generated for the next round. Movement of the 
nodes continue until they get close to the center or their batteries are depleted. Note that, 
nodes stop at a certain distance from the center before reaching it as if there is a 
boundary. The distance is determined by a threshold value which is 1% of the radius. 
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Fig. 4.5 Movement of sensor nodes from the perimeter to the circle as groups. 
 
Figure 4.5 shows a simplified version of deployment and movement phases. As it is 
stated before, we assume a vehicle circles around to deploys nodes. After deployment of 
one group is finished, next deployment point is chosen as the closest bunch point on the 
way. Since nodes starts moving right after they are deployed, movement of the nodes 
looks like a spiral as shown in the Figure 4.5. 
Algorithms that are used for deployment phase and movement phase is explained 
in pseudocode in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 respectively.  
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/*  Terminology 
 sda=standard deviation of angular displacement 
 sdl=standard deviation of linear displacement 
 a=x coordinate of the center point 
 b=y coordinate of the center point 
 GaussianDistribution(mean, std.dev.)= Generates a random  
  number following Gaussian distribution for given 
  mean and standard deviation  
*/ 
1.   SET angle to 0 
2.   FOR each generation 
3. FOR each deployment point on circle (total 8) 
4.  FOR each node that is deployed 
5.   SET r' to GaussianDistribution with (Radius, sdl) 
6.   SET alpha to GaussianDistribution with (angle, sda)  
7.                    
8.                    
9.   STORE initial values in NodeList as a Node  
10.  END FOR 
11.  START moveNodes with NodeList 
12.  EMPTY NodeList 
13.  INCREMENT angle by      
14. ENDFOR 
15.   ENDFOR 
Fig. 4.6 Deployment phase algorithm for circular move mobility model 
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/*  Terminology 
 a=x coordinate of the center point 
 b=y coordinate of the center point 
*/ 
1.SET currentRound to 0 
2.WHILE currentRound < totalRounds 
3. FOR each Node in NodesList 
4.  IF r' is bigger than the threshold value THEN 
5.   COMPUTE random value RandSpeed for minSpeed and maxSpeed 
6.   COMPUTE random value RandAngle for -angSpeed and angSpeed 
7.   SET r' to (r'-RandSpeed) 
8.   SET alpha to (alpha-RandAngle)  
9.                    
10.                    
11.  ENDIF 
12. ENDFOR 
13. INCREMENT currentRound 
14.ENDWHILE 
Fig. 4.7 Movement phase algorithm for circular move mobility model 
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5. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
 
We evaluated performance of our scheme with various simulations. In this 
section, we first explain threat model and then performance metrics. Finally, we give 
simulation results together with configuration and parameters. 
5.1.  Threat Model 
We assume that attacker can learn keys of a node by capturing it. In RoK[5] 
scheme, attacker can compute forward and backward keys separately. In other words, if 
a forward key captured in generation  , it is possible to compute key with same index 
for generations after   and it is also possible for backward keys for generations 
before      . Because key pools in our UKP scheme are distinct, there is no such 
association between keys of different generations. However, the attacker learns all the 
keys in a captured node including keys that belong to further generations. In our model, 
we considered attacker as an eager attacker, which means nodes will be captured at 
constant rate at each round starting with 5th generation and attack does not stop until the 
end of the simulation. 
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5.2.  Performance Metrics 
In WSNs, sensor nodes are assumed to carry sensitive information. There should 
be a secure paths among the nodes. Thus secure connectivity is an important metric. 
Whilst delivering data, nodes should be communicating securely against an 
eavesdropping attacker. Hence, resiliency of the network is another significant metric. 
In this section, we explain these metrics. 
5.2.1.  Local and Global Connectivity 
Local connectivity is an important metric that shows the performance of key 
distribution mechanism. It is defined as the probability of sharing a common key 
between two neighboring sensor nodes. If this value close to one, then most of the nodes 
in the network can communicate securely with almost all neighbors that in the range of 
communication. 
High local connectivity shows that a node can establish a secure communication 
with most of its neighbors. However, high local connectivity does not guarantee high 
global connectivity. Global connectivity is used to check if there are any nodes that are 
not reachable from the rest of the network. It is calculated as the ratio of the number of 
nodes in the largest isolated component to the number of nodes in the whole network.  
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5.2.2.  Resiliency 
When an attacker captures a node, he learns all the keys stored in the node. Hence, 
any established connection between the corrupted node and its neighbors are 
automatically compromised. Moreover, attacker can compromise some other additional 
links, if he knows the keys that are used to establish those links. As more nodes are 
captured, the attacker learns more keys and he can use them to monitor additional 
channels. This presents a threat to the resiliency of network. Thus, ratio of the of 
compromised links is an important metric to evaluate security performance of the  
WSNs. 
 In order to evaluate resiliency of the network, we measure the ratio of 
additionally compromised links after a node capture. This ratio is computed as the 
number of additionally corrupted channels divided by the number of all establishes 
links, which are currently active. The network has better resiliency when the ratio of 
compromised links is smaller. 
5.3.  Configurations 
Simulation code developed with C# using MS Visual Studio 2010. Simulations 
are conducted on a computer with 64-bit Windows 7 running on Intel Core i7-2600 
CPU, 8.00 GB RAM. 
For the sake of a fair comparison, we used similar setup as in the RoK [5] scheme 
for our simulation. We set the number of keys in each pool,  , to 10.000 and key ring 
size, , as 500 for each node. Note that key chain size is     for each of forward and 
backward key rings in the RoK scheme, in order to compare results under same memory 
consumption. Generation window,      is taken as 10 and we assume that a node’s 
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lifetime is determined according to a Gaussian distribution with mean  and        with 
standard deviation        .    
5.3.1.  For Random Walk and Reference Point Group Mobility Models 
The number of nodes in the network is taken as 1.000. Deployment area is 
          meters and sensor node’s wireless communication range is 40 meters. 
Nodes are distributed in that area with uniform random distribution. Speed of a node is 
decided randomly between 5 to 15 meters per minute. Note that, we assume both 
schemes use same mobility patterns for the sake of fairness. Nodes, whose lifetimes are 
expired, are replaced with new ones.  
5.3.2.  For Circular Move Mobility Model 
The number of nodes in the network starts with 200 in one generation and 
increase in time. It stabilizes at average 1.000. At each round 25 nodes are deployed 
from a bunch point and then a new bunch point is picked as mentioned in Circular 
Move Mobility model. When a full circle completed (from initial point to that point 
again), a new generation is started to be deployed. Deployment area is a circle with 
radius 500 meters and sensor node’s wireless communication range is 40 meters. Nodes 
are distributed on eight bunch points with 500 meters of mean and 20 meters of standard 
deviation of linear displacement off the arc.  For angular displacement, mean values 
vary due to different bunch points on circle. These values are                          
       respectively for each bunch point and standard deviation is 15 degrees at each 
bunch point. Linear speed of a node is decided using uniform random distribution 
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between 5 to 10 meters per minute and similarly, angular movement speed decided 
using uniform random distribution between -5 to 5 degrees. We assume both schemes 
use same mobility patterns. 
5.4.  Simulation Results 
We compute local connectivity, global connectivity and resiliency performance of 
our UKP scheme and compare with RoK scheme [5]. Note that one generation  is 10 
rounds for random walk and Reference Point Group Mobility  (RPGM) model and  8 
rounds for Circular Move Mobility model. We run simulations for 300 rounds for 
random walk and RPGM model, and 150 rounds for Circular Move Mobility model. 
Moreover, each result is obtained by taking the average of 25 runs for the sake of 
smoothness of the results. 
 Local connectivity performance for both RoK and our UKP schemes under  
random walk and RPGM models is shown in Figure 5.1. In Figure 5.2, local 
connectivity performance is shown for Circular Move Mobility model. As shown in 
both figures, local connectivity is around the level of 1.0 in all cases. This level is 
almost perfect. 
In Figure 5.3, global connectivity results are given for two mobility models, 
Random Walk and Reference Point Group Mobility model. The global connectivity 
performance is almost perfect level in all cases. Global connectivity ratio results for 
circular move model is given in Figure 5.4. Differently from other models, global 
connectivity decreases significantly at the beginning and then stabilizes at a nearly 
perfect level for both RoK and UKP in Circular Move Mobility model. Such a poor 
global connectivity at the beginning of the deployment is not unexpected in Circular 
Move Mobility model, because nodes are deployed as separate groups at the perimeter. 
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As nodes move in time, they start to spread to the environment and isolated groups get 
close to each other. Hence, global connectivity increases during the movement.  
 
 
Fig. 5.1 Local connectivity of RoK and UKP for Random Walk (RW) and Reference 
Point Group Mobility (RPGM) models 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.2 Local connectivity of RoK and UKP for Circular Move (CM) Mobility model 
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Fig. 5.3 Global connectivity of RoK and UKP for Random Walk (RW) and Reference 
Point Group Mobility (RPGM) models 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.4 Global connectivity of RoK and UKP Circular Move (CM) Mobility 
model 
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For the evaluation of the network resiliency, we consider an attacker who captures 
sensor nodes with rates 1, 3 and 5 nodes per round. In our simulations, attacker starts 
compromising nodes at generation 5 in order to allow some time for network 
stabilization. 
Figure 5.5 gives the resiliency results for RoK and UKP for Random Walk 
Mobility model. It shows that our scheme outperforms RoK [5] scheme in terms of 
resiliency under heavy attack. Resiliency is improved in UKP, as compared to RoK by 
decreased the ratio of the compromised links from almost 50% to 38% where the 
capture rate is 5 nodes per round, and 30% to 22% with the capture rate 3 nodes per 
round. Only under light attack (capture rate = 1 node per round), RoK performs slightly 
better than UKP scheme. Figure 5.6 also gives us similar results with Reference Point 
Group Mobility model. Compared to RoK, we have better results with capture rates 3 
nodes/round and 5 nodes/round. Resiliency of RoK is again slightly better than UKP 
when the capture rate is 1 node/round.  
In Figure 5.7, ratio of the compromised links is presented for Circular Move 
Mobility model. For high capture rates, UKP performs much better than RoK.  Our 
scheme lowers the ratio of compromised links from ~45% to 30% for capture rate 5 
nodes/round, ~25% to 18% for capture rate 3 nodes/round as compared to RoK scheme. 
When the capture rate is 1 node/round, UKP has higher ratio of compromised links than 
RoK but the difference is minimal. As it can be seen from Figure 5.7, additionally 
compromised link ratio has less fluctuation over time for UKP scheme compared to 
RoK scheme. This shows that UKP scheme is more stable in terms of network 
resiliency.  
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Fig. 5.5 Resiliency of RoK and UKP in case of an eager attacker with capture rates of 1, 
3, and 5 nodes per round with Random Walk (RW) model 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.6 Resiliency of RoK and UKP in case of an eager attacker with capture rates of 1, 
3, and 5 nodes per round with Reference Point Group Mobility (RPGM) model. 
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Fig. 5.7 Resiliency of RoK and UKP in case of an eager attacker with capture rates of 1, 
3, and 5 nodes per round with Circular Move (CM) Mobility model. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis, we propose Uneven Key Predistribution (UKP) scheme for 
multiphase wireless sensor networks in mobile environment. Our scheme is based on 
using different and distinct key pools at each generation and usage of keys that are 
drawn unevenly from these pools based on measured age distribution of the nodes. At 
each generation, nodes choose a new set of keys from a new key pool. Therefore, keys 
in the network will be renewed partially at each redeployment phase; this provides self 
healing to the network.  
We employed simulation techniques for the performance evaluation of UKP. We 
also implemented RoK scheme [5] since it serves as a basis to multiphase wireless 
sensor network security. We run simulations for both schemes with same parameters 
and same movement patterns for the sake of a fair comparison. In both schemes, nodes 
use same memory and same computational power in all models and their battery lives 
are randomized by a Gaussian distribution with same mean and standard deviation. 
We run our simulations under different mobility models. Apart from the two 
existing mobility models, we proposed a new one, Circular Move Mobility model, for 
monitoring a circular area by deploying nodes only around the perimeter.  
We improve the resiliency against heavy node capture attacks, whilst maintaining 
almost perfect local and global connectivity for Random Walk and Reference Point 
Group Mobility models. For Circular Move Mobility model, UKP still outperforms in 
terms of resiliency under heavy node capture attacks with almost perfect local 
connectivity. Global connectivity for both RoK and UKP under Circular Move Mobility 
model is very low at the beginning, but it stabilizes around 0.95 at steady state. Also in 
Circular Move Mobility model, UKP scheme's resiliency performance is much more 
stable than RoK. 
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